diff --git a/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md b/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md
index e9de774fa3..39123110e3 100644
--- a/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md
+++ b/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ Want to contribute to Ant Design? There are a few things you need to know.
 
 We wrote a **[contribution guide](https://ant.design/docs/react/contributing)** to help you get started.
 
+## Security
+
+If you're working with GitHub Actions workflows, please read our **[Workflows Security Guide](.github/WORKFLOWS_SECURITY.md)** to understand security best practices.
+
 ---
 
 # 参与共建
@@ -11,3 +15,7 @@ We wrote a **[contribution guide](https://ant.design/docs/react/contributing)**
 想要给 Ant Design 贡献自己的一份力量？
 
 我们写了一份 **[贡献指南](https://ant.design/docs/react/contributing-cn)** 来帮助你开始。
+
+## 安全
+
+如果你需要修改 GitHub Actions 工作流，请阅读我们的 **[工作流安全指南](.github/WORKFLOWS_SECURITY.md)** 以了解安全最佳实践。
diff --git a/.github/WORKFLOWS_SECURITY.md b/.github/WORKFLOWS_SECURITY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2fd445ebc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/WORKFLOWS_SECURITY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# GitHub Actions Workflows Security
+
+This document describes the security measures implemented in ant-design's GitHub Actions workflows to protect against common attack vectors, particularly the "PWN Request" vulnerability.
+
+## Background: PWN Request Vulnerability
+
+The "PWN Request" (or "Pull Request Target") vulnerability occurs when workflows:
+1. Use `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, or `issue_comment` triggers
+2. Check out code from untrusted sources (fork PRs)
+3. Execute that code with elevated privileges or access to secrets
+
+This can allow attackers to:
+- Steal repository secrets
+- Execute remote code in the CI/CD environment
+- Modify repository contents
+- Compromise the supply chain
+
+**Reference**: See [GitHub Security Lab - Preventing PWN Requests](https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)
+
+## Security Principles Applied
+
+### 1. Safe Use of `pull_request_target`
+
+All workflows using `pull_request_target` follow these rules:
+
+- ✅ **NEVER** check out PR code (`actions/checkout` with PR ref)
+- ✅ **NEVER** run `npm install` or similar with PR code
+- ✅ Only interact with PR metadata (comments, labels, status)
+- ✅ Use minimal permissions (explicitly defined per job)
+
+**Safe workflows:**
+- `preview-start.yml` - Only comments on PRs
+- `pr-open-notify.yml` - Only sends notifications
+- `pr-open-check.yml` - Only validates PR content
+- `verify-files-modify.yml` - Only checks file modifications via API
+- `pr-check-merge.yml` - Only comments on branch merge PRs
+- `pr-contributor-welcome.yml` - Only comments on merged PRs
+- `visual-regression-diff-start.yml` - Only comments on PRs
+
+### 2. Separation of Build and Deploy
+
+We use the "build in PR, deploy in workflow_run" pattern:
+
+**Build Phase** (uses `pull_request` trigger):
+- `preview-build.yml` - Builds site from PR code with restricted permissions
+- `visual-regression-diff-build.yml` - Generates screenshots from PR code
+- Uses `pull_request` trigger (no secrets, read-only repository access)
+- Uploads build artifacts (no secrets included)
+
+**Deploy Phase** (uses `workflow_run` trigger):
+- `preview-deploy.yml` - Downloads artifacts and deploys
+- `visual-regression-diff-finish.yml` - Downloads artifacts and posts results
+- Only downloads artifacts, never checks out untrusted code
+- Has access to secrets for deployment
+- Validates PR numbers before use
+
+### 3. Authorization Checks
+
+Workflows that can modify repository state require authorization:
+
+- ✅ `rebase.yml` - Restricts `/rebase` command to MEMBER, COLLABORATOR, or OWNER
+- ✅ `verify-files-modify.yml` - Checks contributor authority for protected paths
+- ✅ `pr-check-merge.yml` - Only runs for ant-design organization PRs
+
+### 4. Minimal Permissions
+
+All workflows follow the principle of least privilege:
+
+```yaml
+permissions:
+  contents: read  # Default read-only access
+
+jobs:
+  specific-job:
+    permissions:
+      # Only grant what's needed
+      issues: write
+      pull-requests: write
+```
+
+### 5. Pinned Action Versions
+
+Critical actions are pinned to specific commit SHAs:
+- `actions-cool/verify-files-modify@9f38a3b3d324d4d92c88c8a946001522e17ad554`
+
+This prevents supply chain attacks via compromised action updates.
+
+### 6. Input Validation
+
+All external inputs are validated:
+- PR numbers are validated as numeric before use
+- File paths are checked before operations
+- User associations are verified before privileged operations
+
+## Workflow Security Checklist
+
+When adding or modifying workflows, ensure:
+
+- [ ] If using `pull_request_target`, NEVER check out PR code
+- [ ] If using `pull_request_target`, NEVER run untrusted code
+- [ ] If using `issue_comment` with code execution, check `author_association`
+- [ ] If using `workflow_run`, only download artifacts or check out base branch
+- [ ] Permissions are explicitly set to minimum required
+- [ ] Secrets are only used in trusted contexts
+- [ ] All user inputs are validated
+- [ ] Third-party actions are from trusted sources
+- [ ] Critical actions are pinned to commit SHAs
+
+## Incident Response
+
+If a security vulnerability is discovered:
+
+1. Immediately disable the affected workflow
+2. Report to security team via [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md)
+3. Do not disclose publicly until patched
+4. Review all recent workflow runs for signs of exploitation
+
+## References
+
+- [GitHub Security Lab - Preventing PWN Requests](https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)
+- [GitHub Actions Security Best Practices](https://blog.gitguardian.com/github-actions-security-cheat-sheet/)
+- [OpenSSF - Mitigating Attack Vectors in GitHub Workflows](https://openssf.org/blog/2024/08/12/mitigating-attack-vectors-in-github-workflows/)
+- [PostHog - Shai Hulud Attack Post-Mortem](https://posthog.com/blog/nov-24-shai-hulud-attack-post-mortem)
diff --git a/.github/workflows/rebase.yml b/.github/workflows/rebase.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6579220d5f..0000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/rebase.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-name: Automatic Rebase
-
-on:
-  issue_comment:
-    types: [created]
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  rebase:
-    permissions:
-      contents: write  # for cirrus-actions/rebase to push code to rebase
-      pull-requests: read  # for cirrus-actions/rebase to get info about PR
-    name: Rebase
-    if: github.event.issue.pull_request != '' && (contains(github.event.comment.body, '/rebase') || contains(github.event.comment.body, '\rebase'))
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v6
-      with:
-        fetch-depth: 0
-    - name: Automatic Rebase
-      uses: cirrus-actions/rebase@1.8
-      env:
-        GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}